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The aim of this study is to better understand how family involvement in ownership manage-
ment  and direction affects the ﬁnancial performance of the Lebanese companies. In order to
authenticate our hypotheses, we collected primary data by using a quantitative method. In
fact, we performed an inquiry by surveying 75 Lebanese companies through a questionnaire
formed  by closed and semi-open questions and modulators. While ﬁnishing the empirical
study,  we concluded that family involvement in ownership and management has a posi-
tive  relationship with the ﬁnancial performance of the Lebanese company. Moreover, issues
like  entrenchment and asymmetric altruism did not prove to have a signiﬁcant relationshipwith  the ﬁnancial performance. The essential reason to the results previously stated is that
family managers in Lebanon act as stewards by considering the success of the company as
their own, rather than agents seeking to achieve their personal beneﬁt on the expense of
the company.
©  2013 Holy Spirit University of Kaslik. Hosting by Elsevier B.V. 1.  Introduction
A recent attempt to investigate the state of the corporate
governance in emerging markets, highlighted family ﬁrms
as  being an essential yet an understudied topic (Claessens
&  Yurtoglu, 2012). However, Family businesses play a major
role  in the economy of both emerging markets and most
developed economies. In fact, family ﬁrms constitute an
essential  part of capital markets as most of the large listed
companies present the characteristic of ownership concentra-
tion  which can be mostly linked to family owned companies.
Although family businesses present some advantages in terms
of  employee loyalty and long-term relationships, they also
present  some cons by acknowledging the risk of the owner’s
concentration on ﬁrm’s survival and neglecting the concept
of  wealth maximization. As a matter of fact, the owner’s
goal  will be only concentrated on how to safely pass on
the  business to future generations (Miller & Le Breton-Miller,
2005).
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While having a strong family oriented culture, the Arab
orld  has long had family businesses in the core of its econ-
my.  Several historical and cultural values contributed to the
amily  dominance in the MENA  region to extend to businesses.
mpirical studies in the GOLF exhibited the supremacy of
amily  businesses on commercial activities. The study con-
ucted  demonstrated that 98% of commercial activities in the
ulf  Cooperation Council presented the characteristic of large
wnership  by one family.
Moreover, from the time where the Lebanese people were
alled  Phoenicians, family businesses not only predominates
he  Lebanese economy, but also contributes to the mainte-
ance  of its stability.
Acknowledging the fact that the world is ﬁlled with fam-
ly  businesses, it is of high importance to study components
hat  may  affect their performance. Therefore in this study, we
re going to concentrate on the state of ownership manage-
ent  and direction of family ﬁrms and their relationship with
he  ﬁnancial performance. Our sample will be restricted to
ebanon  but the literature can be somehow representative of
he  MENA  region, as Lebanon and the Arab world share some
ultural  similarities.
To  sum up, we  are going to discuss in the following: In
ebanon, how does family involvement in ownership man-
gement  and direction, affect the ﬁnancial performance of the
ompany?
The  ﬁrst part will include a literature review of family ﬁrms
s  well as the formulation of our hypothesis, and the second
art  will include the methodology adopted and the perfor-
ance  of the empirical study.
.  Family  business  review
.1.  Family  business  particularities
amily enterprises have their important role in the world
conomy as their presence is not restricted to one country
r  region but exists all around the world. Thus, it is of high
alue  to understand what a family business is. Different deﬁ-
itions  of family ﬁrms have emerged in recent years, but there
as  no clear compromise about what deﬁnes them. Although
he  agreement on one explication of family businesses was
bsent,  common ground could be acknowledged by most def-
nitions.  In fact, most interpretations highlighted ownership,
amily  involvement, family control and the intention of trans-
erring  the business to future generations as key components
f  what could be classiﬁed as family ﬁrms. Even if some def-
nitions  could still be questionable, the elements mentioned
bove  present the center variables that are crucial to describe
ny  ﬁrm as a family owned company (Chrisman, Chua, &
harma,  2005).
The  notion of family owned businesses derive from many
oncepts.  Bowman-Upton suggests a basic description, by
tating  that a family business can be deﬁned by having the
ajority  of ownership and control retained by the family
embers. On the other hand, Churchill and Hatten afﬁrm that
 family ﬁrm is a company that is operated by the founder and
here  there is an expectation that a younger family member e n t r e v i e w 1 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 30–41 31
will  receive the control of the business after an older member
(Churchill & Hatten, 1987) (Tables 1–4).
Another deﬁnition that unites the ﬁrst two is that fam-
ily  businesses are managed and/or governed with the aim to
shape and engage in the vision of the business that is shared
by  a dominant alliance, controlled by members of the same
family  or a small number of families, in a way  that is main-
tainable across generations.
Chrisman  et al. also found that a family business is distin-
guished not only by ownership, governance, and control that
are  retained by the family, but also by the next generation suc-
cession  (Chrisman et al., 2005). Therefore, the family will not
only  retain control of the ﬁrm’s corporate behavior, but also
will  acquire the idiosyncratic resources that result from family
involvement.
The  Family Owned Cultural Scale was developed by Astra-
chan  et al. with the purpose to determine family engagement
in  business (Astrachan, Klien, & Smyrnios, 2002). Among their
ﬁndings,  was  the attachment of culture to the family busi-
ness  deﬁnition; in fact, the family particular culture would be
transmitted to the company’s culture as time pass.
Villalonga and Amit have clearly speciﬁed that there are
three  main factors common to any family business: First, one
or  more  families detain a signiﬁcant part of capital (Villalonga
&  Amit, 2006). Second, family members have signiﬁcant con-
trol  over the company that may  include statutory or legal
boundaries over the voting right and the capital distribution
among none family shareholders. Third, top level manage-
ment  is bound to family members.
To sum it up, the deﬁnition of family ﬁrms is made up of
all  the above concepts. Factors like ownership, the transition
of  culture, the aptitude to be transferred to future genera-
tions,  and family involvement and control are key components
for  associating any type of business to the family ﬁrm con-
cept.  Yet, family ﬁrms present many  particularities. Family
ﬁrms  mostly relate to Small and Medium businesses, and their
founder  is generally classiﬁed as an Entrepreneur. In the fol-
lowing,  we are going to discuss these originalities.
The term family will associate many  characteristics for
these  kinds of businesses. In fact, family is a many  sided term.
Each  family has their own values, culture, history, ethnicity,
and  generations. They are formed by people related with com-
mon  history, emotional bonding, and shared future objectives.
In  addition, although the word family can relate the mind to
biological  blood relation, Steward afﬁrms that some family
businesses may  not have direct biological kinship, mentioning
in-laws  as an example (Stewart, 2003). Consequently, it can be
entitled as “none biological family” or quasi-family (Carsrud,
2006;  Karra, Tracey, & Phillips, 2006).
Moreover, many  of the family ﬁrms are Small or Medium
Enterprises. SMEs present a set of particularities. The “Com-
mission  Recommendation” published by the European Union,
set  constraints to deﬁning ﬁrms as small and medium enter-
prises  by having hired less than 250 employees, along with
an  annual balance sheet not exceeding 43 million euro,
and  a 50 million Euros restriction for annual turnover (The
Commission Recommendation, 2003). Small and Medium
Enterprises have a family oriented ownership and manage-
ment  where the family’s culture and values are transmitted
throughout the company and employees. These categories of
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Table 1 – Spearman test of correlations for the independent variables of section 1 with the 2012 ROA.
Correlation FO PFM CEO ROA
Ownership of the
business
Correlation  Coefﬁcient 1.000 789′′ −.126 .695′′
Sig. (2-tailed) 000 .445 .000
N 39 39 39 39
Family managers in
the  business
Correlation  coefﬁcient .789′′ 1.000 −0.34 .552′′
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .838 .000
N  39 39 39 39
Presence of family
CEO
Correlation  coefﬁcient −.126 −0.34 1.000 −.136
Sig. (2-tailed) .445 .838 .409
N 39 39 39 39
Return on assets for
2012
Correlation  Coefﬁcient .695′′ .552′′ −.136 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .409
N 39 39 39 39
Table 2 – Spearman test of correlations for the independent variables of Section 1 with the 2012 EBIT.
FO PFM CEO EBIT
Ownership of the
business
Correlation  coefﬁcient 1.000 .789′′ −.126 .660′′
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .445 .000
N  39 39 39 39
Family managers in
the  business
Correlation  coefﬁcient .789′′ 1.000 −.034 .477′′
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .838 .002
N  39 39 39 39
Presence of family
CEO
Correlation  coefﬁcient −.126 −.034 1.000 −.130
Sig.  (2-tailed) .445 .838 .431
N  39 39 39 39
′′ ′′
3
EBIT for 2012
Correlation  coefﬁcient 
Sig.  (2-tailed)
N  
ﬁrms are an inﬂuential form of enterprises in the globe. In
fact,  they have a signiﬁcant impact on economic development
of  countries. They present a major source of employment,
along with being a leading supplier of innovation and new
Table 3 – Spearman test of correlations for the independent var
MFO
Sp r The relationship linking
family  owners to high
corporate  managers
Correlation
coefﬁcient
1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 39 
Length of occupancy of
managerial  position
Correlation
coefﬁcient
−.051
Sig. (2-tailed) .756
N 39 
Degree of perceived
qualiﬁcation of managers
Correlation
coefﬁcient
−.119
Sig. (2-tailed) .471
N 39 
The manager is open to
innovation
Correlation
coefﬁcient
−.130
Sig. (2-tailed) .430
N 39 
Degree of manager use of
company  resources for
personal  objectives
Correlation
coefﬁcient
.098
Sig. (2-tailed) .554
N 39 
Return on Assets for 2012 Correlation
coefﬁcient
−.187
Sig. (2-tailed) .255
N 39 .660 .477 −.130 1.000
.000 .002 .431
9 39 39 39
product development (Fan & Yang, 2010). By having those
aspects,  small and medium enterprises contribute in reducing
the  unemployment rate, and thus, inﬂuencing the diminution
of  level of poverty. They also offer an added value output,
iables with the 2012 ROA.
 LTM PQ DO UPR  ROA
 −.051 −119 −.130 .098 −.187
.756 .471 .430 .554 .255
39 39 39 39 39
 1.000 .048 −.012 .339′ −.033
 .771 .945 .035 .841
39 39 39 39 39
 .048 1.000 −.389′ .240 .339′
 .771 .014 .141 .035
39 39 39 39 39
 −.012 −.389′ 1.000 −.430′′ −.299
 .945 .014 .006 .065
39 39 39 39 39
 .339′ .240 −.430′′ 1.000 .137
 .035 .141 .006 .405
39 39 39 39 39
 −.033 339′ −.299 .137 1.000
 .841 .035 .065 .405
39 39 39 39 39
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Table 4 – Spearman test of correlations for the independent variables with the 2012 EBIT.
MFO LTM PQ DO UPR EBIT
The relationship linking family
owners  to high corporate
managers
Correlation
coefﬁcient
1.000 −.051 −.119 −.130 .098 −.170
Sig.  (2-tailed) .756 .471 .430 .554 .302
N  39 39 39 39 39 39
Length of occupancy
of  managerial
position
Correlation
coefﬁcient
−.051 1.000 .048 −.012 .339′ .120
Sig.  (2-tailed) .756 .771 .945 .035 .466
N  39 39 39 39 39 39
Degree of perceived
qualiﬁcation of
managers
Correlation
coefﬁcient
−.119 .048 1.000 −.389′ .240 .170
Sig.  (2-tailed) .471 .771 .014 .141 .302
N  39 39 39 39 39 39
The manager is open
to innovation
Correlation
coefﬁcient
−.130 −.012 −.389′ 1.000 −.430′′ −.345′
Sig. (2-tailed) .430 .945 .014 .006 .032
N  39 39 39 39 39 39
Degree of manager
use  of company
resources for
personal  objectives
Correlation
coefﬁcient
.098 .339′ .240 −.430′′ 1.000 .114
Sig.  (2-tailed) .554 .035 .141 .006 .490
N  39 39 39 39 39 39
Return on Assets for
Correlation
coefﬁcient
−.170 .120 .170 −.345′ .114 1.000
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Sig.  (2-tailed) .302
N 39 
ontribute on reducing the importations, increase exporta-
ions,  and are a base for skill development. Having all these
eneﬁts,  their role is vital for attaining economic development
nd  growth.
.2.  Agency  theory
gency theory is regularly used to explain different motiva-
ions  inside a company, and provide mechanisms seeking to
lign those interests through the implementation of effective
orporate  governance structure. The origin of the agency prob-
em  is the separation of ownership and management (Berle
 Means, 1932). A prime identiﬁcation of the agency theory
tates  that the agency relationship is a contract under one
arty  (the principal) elects another party (the agent) to exe-
ute  some services on their behalf (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
n  a wider explanation, it is the relationship that relates the
wner,  in the form of investor, shareholder or equity holder
hich  is considered the principal to the higher corporate pos-
tions  controlling and directing the particular company which
s  the agent. The agency theory holds many  presumptions
bout its consequences. First, interests between shareholders
nd  managers are different, as each one of them work to max-
mize  their own personal utility and wealth. The second is that
etween  the principal and the agent, an asymmetry of infor-
ation  exists by acknowledging the fact that the agent will
lways  have more  information about what is happening in the
ompany  than the owner. Based on these assumptions, costs
nd  conﬂicts will be created.
First,  the agency cost can be viewed as a consequence of the
xistence  of an information disadvantage between the princi-
al  and the agent. Hence, the owner will exhibit more  costs in
rder to gather information of what an agent is doing through
athering  information about the ﬁnancial statements pre-
ared,  providing extensive auditing measures, and performing.466 .302 .032 .490
39 39 39 39 39
periodical  supervision visits. In addition, the attempt to align
the  interest between the two, the principal may  have to endure
more  costs, reﬂected by giving the agent stock option compen-
sation.  However, in the case of family owned companies, when
the  top corporate positions are ﬁlled by the owner or part of
his  family, the agency cost problem is mitigated.
In fact, the presence of the founder or family member in
the  agent position will automatically align shareholders ﬁnan-
cial  incentives with those of the managers (Jensen & Meckling,
1976).
Another  issue proposed by the agency theory is the moral
hazard  problem. The moral  hazard problem occurs when man-
agers  seek to work for their own interest neglecting the proper
interests  of the company. Financially, the moral  hazard prob-
lem  sets surface when the agent makes a decision about
how  much  risk will the company take, while shareholders
bear the cost, if things get bad. Acknowledging the tradeoff
between risk and reward,  managers will seek to take more
risks,  and, thus, rewarding themselves high wages, without
thinking  morally about the risk they are making sharehol-
ders  endure. In fact, managerial myopia refers to the fact
that  people in high managerial positions will focus on having
short  term proﬁts rather than on long term objectives (Kuttner,
1986).  However, in the case of family businesses that have
family  members as high corporate managers with effective
decision making power, the moral  hazard effect could be miti-
gated.  Family managers can make better investment decisions
since  they have a long term focus, and thus avoid managerial
myopia in the decision making process. In fact, family mem-
bers  will focus on the long term sustainability of the company,
rather  than on short term high wages  (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006;
James,  1999; Stein, 1988, 1989).
As inspected above, family owned ﬁrms seem to have less
issues  and costs than none family ﬁrms. In fact, the nature of
family  ﬁrms allows an instinct alignment of interest between
 n a g 34  i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t r a t e g i c m a
owners and managers. Due to ownership concentration and
control  over the ﬁrm, a competitive advantage in terms of
monitoring  the ﬁrm will be created (Lee, 2004). Moreover, fam-
ily  owned ﬁrms having familiar control over its management,
will  have more  resources available due to lesser agency costs,
and,  thus, will have for example, more  funds to ﬁnance long
term  investments (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). Therefore,
ﬁrms  with high concentration of ownership will reach a reduc-
tion  in asymmetry of information concerning main factors
affecting  the shape of the company like risk management,
company resources allocation and potential growth strate-
gies.  The business resources will not be expected to potential
misuse.  Hence, monitoring and transaction costs will be min-
imized.  As shown above family businesses that have family
members  serving as agents, present certain immunity against
agency  costs and the moral  hazard problem.
In a deeper analysis of the agency theory inside fam-
ily  businesses, another issue may  reconstitute the costs of
agency  and the moral  hazard problem. This issue is called
entrenchment. Entrenchment is deﬁned as a relational con-
tract  relating managers and owners that enables both parties
to  occupy core positions in the company for a signiﬁcant time.
Entrenchment is common to different types of businesses.
However it is more  dominant in the family owned companies,
as  executives may  be family members or friends therefore, the
owners  may  let their relationship and emotions affect their
decision  toward their competencies. Schulze, Lubatkin and
Dino  propose the source of entrenchment as the result of an
unbalanced  power given to family executives that originated
from  their relationship with family owners (Schulze, Lubatkin,
&  Dino, 2003). Thus, family owners relational contracting
will  be the cause of increasing agency costs as shareholders
of  family owned ﬁrms will separate the managerial family
employment from performance. This separation is due to the
idiosyncratic  expectations set while signing the contract of
employment.  While none family contracting sets standards of
high  competencies and expertise, family principal and agent
will  have different standards as they tend to seek none eco-
nomic  goals. Therefore family principal with family agent
contract  of employment will have goals related to emotions
and  sentiments that are far from economic rationality. It is
in  this case that agency costs will be reconstituted. These
agency  costs will appear in the form of hold-up problems.
Hold-up problems begin their effect when family management
acquires high extent of power that is due to their family sta-
tus  rather than their knowledge and expertise. Thus, they will
use their position to serve their proper self-interest (Gomez-
Mejia,  Nuﬁez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001). Having their positions
entrenched in the company, family managers will bound both
outside  and inside directors to them. This will imply neg-
ative  consequences on the autonomy of the board and its
overseeing  role, thus agency costs will be reborn. A basic
yet  important agency cost will arise from the long period in
which  family CEO will remain in his position long after he
has  stopped being effective, therefore harming organizational
performance. Furthermore, much  rights and power accorded
to  family management will strengthen their entrenchment
and thus leading to a never ending cycle that will eventually
inﬂate the harm on owners’ welfare (Gomez-Mejia, Martin, &
Marianna,  2003; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2001).e m e n t r e v i e w 1 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 30–41
Entrenchment will have another negative effect in terms of
employee  motivation, productivity, morale and ambition. As
family members are entrenched in their managerial positions
less  top managerial positions will be available for employee
promotion or outside experts. In addition, entrenched execu-
tives  possess the power to redistribute beneﬁts for themselves
applying excessive self-compensation or special dividends
and  thus having less proﬁt distribution for employees (Lee,
2004).
Entrenchment negative effects extend to reinitiating the
moral  hazard problem. The nature of ownership and control
in  family businesses may  consequent in emancipating fam-
ily  management from monitoring and punishment which will
result in problems in terms of self-control (Schulze et al.,
2001).  Many psychological factors may  drive executives to
act  in an immoral  way. First, the desire to manage a bigger
company and, thus, focusing on sales maximization at the
expense  of proﬁts. Second, having their positions secured fam-
ily  executives may  be unwilling to adhere to innovation. Third,
executives  will tend to focus on short term proﬁts rather than
having  a long-term aim (Lee, 2004).
In order to allay the effect of the agency costs and the moral
hazard  problem, companies must apply effective corporate
governance mechanisms in the legal, institutional, and cul-
tural  ﬁelds. Whether in family ﬁrms or in companies having
the  characteristic of large ownership, appropriate corporate
governance will have its positive effect in different aspects
of  the company. In fact, owners will have more  control over
inside  executives whether they were corporate insiders or out-
siders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
2.3.  Stewardship  theory
In contrast to the agency theory which highly stresses on the
economic  rationality of agents, stewardship theory consid-
ers  other models of man  that emphasizes on organizational
psychology and sociology. Stewardship theory implies the
transformation of agents into role holders. Role holders will
strive  for the need to achieve, seek self-satisfaction through
being  successful at their intrinsic challenging job and abiding
to  rules and regulations (McClelland, 1961). Stewards are orga-
nizationally  oriented employees, who seek the best interest
of  the company rather than their own interests, as they view
the  prosperity of the company as a factor that will positively
affect  their own being (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997).
Therefore,  interests of agents and principals will be automat-
ically  aligned, and there will be no more  need for processes
aiming to control agents. Although owners and executives
will  continue seeking their own interest within the company,
that  will only be obtainable by achieving common goals. In
fact,  owners will seek wealth maximization through their own
capital investment, and executives will seek to amplify their
own  value and involvement in the owners company, in order
to  retain economic advantages that they beneﬁt of from this
involvement (Tosi, Brownlee, Silva, & Katz, 2003). In order to
maximize his utility functions, the steward will act in a way
that  will meet different shareholders interest.
While stewardship theory is used to describe the ethical
goal  aligning agent–principal relationship in all companies,
it  also plays a central role in family ﬁrms. Leaders that have
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n intrinsic role within their organization will dedicate them-
elves  to make it succeed, even at the cost of personal sacriﬁce.
n  order to achieve that, the owner of the family ﬁrm must
ransmit  a strong oriented values corporate culture, through
mplementing a stewardship oriented governance initiatives.
his  will enable leaders to assemble a set of loyal either family
r  none family agents who will dedicate themselves to achieve
rganizational best interest (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006;
ahra,  Hayton, Neubaum, Dibrell, & Craig, 2008). The conse-
uence  of the transmission of steward governance behavior
ill  only take action in a design of core organizational val-
es  and in an internal sense of responsibility. This will enable
he  company to cut off the agency costs that arise from control
ased  methods. In fact, they will no longer be needed as agents
ill  most likely act in a way  that will beneﬁt both parties, and
hus,  beneﬁt the company.
Paradox  to the agency theory, stewardship theory argues
he  psychological and societal aspect of the organization
ather than the economical one. However, measuring steward-
hip  in the corporate governance system present difﬁculties
s  the case of each leader will differ psychologically from
he  other. If the stewardship theory is considered inside the
amily  ﬁrm the leader will most likely apply rules and reg-
lations  favoring internal organizational processes that lead
o  empowerment. In fact, by having empowered agents, each
xecutive  will feel the amount of responsibility accorded to
im,  and thus will be accountable for his actions. Therefore,
oals  and motivations of principals and agents will be aligned
eading  to a constructive form of organizational governance
ased  on stewardship rooted behavior that will beneﬁt the
ompany.
Conversely,  the stewardship theory’s positive effects will be
utomatically ceased when there is a risk of a takeover. In fact,
aving  their future inside the company threatened, agents will
egin seeking their own interest rather than the interest of the
ompany  and its shareholders.
In  sum, each of these theories must be taken into consider-
tion  according to the situation of each company. It is the level
f  environmental contingency, in addition to the preferences
f  the owner that will dictate what theory should be taken into
onsideration.
.  Family  involvement  and  ﬁnancial
erformance
.1.  Family  involvement  in  ownership  and
anagement and  ﬁnancial  performance
amily involvement in ownership and management is one of
he  main protagonists inﬂuencing the corporate governance
f  family owned companies. According to Berle and Means
wnership concentration will align the interests between
wnership and management, and mitigate the amount of
gency  costs (Berle & Means, 1932). Thus, higher ﬁnan-
ial  performance could be achieved. Similarly, Jensen and
eckling  state that the presence of managers that possess
igh  level of ownership will most likely generate better
orporate governance since an alignment of managers and
hareholders incentives is automatically produced (Jensen e n t r e v i e w 1 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 30–41 35
&  Meckling, 1976). Furthermore, if the majority of owners
are  not implicated in the ﬁrm’s management, they will be
less  able to supervise and control agents (Shleifer & Vishny,
1986).  Therefore, they will endure more  agency costs in their
attempt  to control and supervise the executives. Usually
family businesses have high involvement and long tenure
in  management. Thus, by their high involvement they will
succeed  at having a better sense of recognition of uncertain-
ties  and opportunities and also by establishing a long term
focus  (Zahra, 2005). Moreover, family ﬁrms proved to be bet-
ter  than none family businesses in the investment decision
making  process. In fact, the presence of family managers
will  consequent a long term focus and will mitigate manage-
rial  myopia (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006). Family business has
also  outperformed none family business in both proﬁtability
and  ﬁnancial structures. In addition, family involvement in
terms  of control highly affects the proﬁtability of the company
(Allouche, Amann, Jaussaud, & Kurashina, 2008). In fact, busi-
nesses  where the largest shareholder is a family member, the
existence  of an institutional investor as second shareholder
will  foster the business value.
In further analysis, the resource based theory inspects the
distinctive  intangible resources particular to each company.
These  resources form the particular competitive advantage
of  the ﬁrm over its peers (Barney, 1991). In fact, family busi-
nesses  have also unique resources that may  award them a
competitive  advantage over their peers. Sirmon and Hitt have
stated  5 foundations that favor family owned businesses over
its  peers: survivability, governance structures, patient, human,
and  social (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). In fact, family ﬁrms acquire
all  those sources and transmute them into competitive advan-
tages  by:
•  The focus on customer and aim on a market niche, that will
result  in higher proﬁts;
•  The concern of protecting the family name which will con-
sequent  a higher quality of products;
• Concentrated ownership structure that will result on a long
term  focus on investment and will enhance corporate pro-
ductivity;
•  Intersecting responsibilities between owners and managers
which  will mitigate agency costs (Poza, 2006).
Other argumentation exhibited the neutrality of the inﬂu-
ence  of family involvement on ﬁnancial results. King and
Santor  stated that ownership concentration could not have
a  perceptible effect on the company performance (King &
Santor,  2009). They added that inefﬁcient ownership struc-
tures  might fail over the long run. They summed this issue up
by  denying the existence of statistical relationship between
ownership and performance.
Several  empirical studies have backed the vision that the
involvement of the family in business will foster its ﬁnan-
cial  performance. In the study of more  than 1600 Western
European companies, Maury revealed that constant and active
control  by family executives was  linked to higher proﬁts, justi-
ﬁed  by the mitigation of agency problems between principals
and  agents (Maury, 2006). Another study of the S&P 500 by Mar-
tikainen  et al. was done to question whether higher earnings
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of family owned companies was  associated to efﬁciency and
variations  in production technologies (Martikainen, Nikkinen,
&  Vähämaa, 2009). The end of the study showed no signiﬁ-
cant  difference between the production technologies between
family  and none family businesses, thereby proposing that dif-
ferences in output is due to higher efﬁciency performed in
family  owned companies. A comparison was  done by Andres
between  family ﬁrms and its peers in Germany (Andres, 2008).
The  result resolved that not only do family owned compa-
nies  outperform large owned ﬁrms, but also is more  proﬁtable
than  other companies having different types of block hold-
ers.  Nevertheless, he declares that this higher performance is
conditioned by having the founder still active in management
or  on the board of directors. Anderson and Reeb also stud-
ied  the S&P 500 and demonstrated the superiority of family
ﬁrms  to none family ﬁrms in terms of performance (Anderson
&  Reeb, 2003). Their study resulted on a higher performance
of  family ﬁrms in both accounting and market measures con-
strained  by the presence of founders involved in the company.
Their  analysis also point to a difference in family business
performance based on managerial status. In fact, top level
positions  occupied by family members whether founders or
heirs demonstrate a positive link with accounting proﬁtabil-
ity.  Nonetheless, according to the same study, higher market
performance is only achieved when the managerial position
is  occupied by the owner or an outside director, heirs acting
as  managers did not affect market performance.
Family ﬁrms usually represent the characteristic of being
founded  by a family entrepreneur owning most shares in the
company.  When at the start-up phase they have few numbers
of  employees, where informal behavior is adopted along with
a  centralized decision making power, and fewer hierarchical
levels. Founders of family ﬁrms will feel that they have more
direct  control over the behavior of employees, as well as the
ability  to directly export cultural and ethical guidelines to the
company  through their own behavior (Ciavarella, 2003).
Therefore,  by complying with what Fama and Jensen
argued, family involvement contribute to an alignment of
interest  between agent and principal and consequent fewer
agency  problems (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In addition, the desire
of  protection of family name and long term focus are char-
acteristics of family stewards. Based on what precedes, we
formulate  our ﬁrst working hypothesis:
H1. Family involvement in ownership and management is
positively correlated to ﬁnancial performance.
4.  Entrenchment,  asymmetric  altruism  and
ﬁnancial  performance
Carney identiﬁes “personalism” as the main source of man-
agerial  entrenchment (Carney, 2005). This factor will allow
the  governing family alliance to be less constrained by trans-
parency  and accountability (Carney, 2005; Morck, Shleifer, &
Vishny,  1988). Entrenchment will present a central cause of
negative  performance of a family owned company. In fact,
the  relationship between family owners and close related
managers will enable them to keep central positions in the
company  for a signiﬁcant time. By sustaining their positions,e m e n t r e v i e w 1 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 30–41
the  entrenched managers will not only limit the opportunity
of  appointment of new qualiﬁed managers, but also affect
employee motivation. In fact, entrenchment will limit the
opportunity  of qualiﬁed employees to get the chance of occu-
pying  high corporate positions inside the company (Morck &
Yeung,  2003). This will imply a deterioration of employee moti-
vation  and consequently productivity. Similarly, entrenched
executives have the power to redistribute to their own pocket
through  special dividends and excessive compensation, which
will  also negatively affect employee motivation and commit-
ment.  While the productivity of family owned businesses
relies on the motivation of its employees, their demotivation
will  negatively affect the ﬁrm ﬁnancial performance, and con-
sequently  the whole ﬁrm’s performance (Lee, 2004).
In  addition, in a globalized environment where competi-
tion  is at its peak the importance of innovation is crucial.
Oppositely, having their positions secured, entrenched man-
agers  may  stick to their own and old ways of doing and refuse
to  adhere to innovation (Lee, 2004). This will reduce the com-
pany’s  competitive advantage, and thus contributing to lower
ﬁnancial  results.
Furthermore, in their desire to manage bigger companies,
entrenched managers may  focus on the sales maximization at
the expense of proﬁt maximization (Lee, 2004). While focusing
on  sales at the expense of proﬁt, entrenched executives may
adopt  strategies to increase turnover regardless of the proﬁt.
Plus,  even though family shareholders have the largest
stake  in large family owned companies, minority sharehol-
ders  still have interests to claim form the company. A conﬂict
arises  from this composition, as owners will use their power
to  gain beneﬁts at the expense of the private wealth of minor-
ity  shareholders (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella,
2007).  Moreover, concentration of ownership will lead large
investors  to exercise their power in ways that trail to obtain-
ing  private beneﬁts. This may  not be dangerous in none family
business  where ownership is spread among a large amount
of  investors, but it is most harmful in case of family ﬁrms
where  the beneﬁts will remain at the disposal of family mem-
bers  (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). In fact, family shareholders
want to secure their proper interests as they intend to ensure
the  preservation of capital and stability within the company,
which  may  conﬂict with the interests of minority sharehol-
ders.
In  addition, particularism is also identiﬁed by Carney
(Carney, 2005). Particularism explains the emphasis of the
dominant  family coalition toward psychological ownership
of  the business. It also discusses the difference that may
arise  from the conﬂict between the dominant family group’s
interests  and the ﬁrm’s interests. This conﬂict between the
economic  interest of the ﬁrm and both the economic and
none  economic interest of the family coalition will result
in  the concept of asymmetric altruism. It is a harmful
self-discipline problem idiosyncratic among family owned
companies (Chrisman et al., 2005).
In general, asymmetric altruism represents the informal
control and monitoring procedures that will result in the
avoidance  of disciplinary conduct that has repercussions on
the  familial relations either inside or outside the company
(Schulze et al., 2003). It will also lead to family based conﬂicts
due  to the different desires among family members which will
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mphasize the need for increased governance requirements
Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 2005).
Moreover, asymmetric altruism will also imply the aversion
o  external monitoring and outside directors or underestimat-
ng  their effectiveness (Schulze et al., 2001). In contrast, as
wnership  dispersion grows companies will highly need out-
ide  monitoring for their multiple operations.
Family oriented forms of altruism may  create spoiled fam-
ly  agents giving them incentives to act opportunistically, and
hus  resulting in governance inefﬁciencies (Lubatkin, Durand,
 Ling, 2007). Governance inefﬁciencies will also negatively
ffect  company procedures and thus leading to poorer perfor-
ance.
Both  issues will also affect family corporates perception of
isk.  In fact, family owned companies have personal wealth,
one  economic objectives related to the ﬁrm shown by their
urpose  to transmit the business to future generations, and
ndiversiﬁed  human capital. Thus family managers endure
uperior  personal risk (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). Considering
ll  those factors, family agents will miss out many  opportu-
ities  of new investment in their aim to become more  risk
verse.  Therefore, the tendency to be more  risk averse along
ith  the divergence between family objectives and ﬁrm objec-
ives  will lead to poor ﬁnancial performance. Carney shows
hat  these factors will form a competitive disadvantage for
arge  ﬁrms that have high capital and research development
equirements (Carney, 2005).
Accordingly, some empirical studies contested the ability
f  family owned companies to outperform its none-family
rm’s peers. Baek et al. compared the performance of fam-
ly  owned and none family owned companies during the
orean  crisis of 1997 (Baek, Kang, & Suh Park, 2004). He found
hat  ﬁrms having high concentration of ownership by family
hareholders that also act as agents, suffered larger drop in
quity  value than ﬁrms having wide ownership. Moreover, a
tudy of Norwegian companies uncovered a negative corre-
ation  between family involvement in ownership and control
nd  the ﬁrm’s productivity (Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schønea,
005).
In  sum, problems caused by asymmetric altruism and
ntrenchment will lead to excessive risk aversion and thus
ill  limit opportunity for new investments as well as the
mplementation of proﬁtable growth strategies. Family mem-
ers  will also seek to put into operation mechanisms to
onstantly retain the private beneﬁts gained from control.
ominating shareholders and high corporate executives
an  manipulate the ﬁrm ﬁnancial results through rewarding
hemselves with high salaries, the engagement in poor
nvestments, unnecessary beneﬁts, and by employing family
embers  in high managerial positions that are less quali-
ed  than outsiders (Pérez-González, 2006). The existence of
arge  family shareholders will foster entrenchment of none
ualiﬁed  managers that will take advantage of the private
eneﬁts  gained from control (Santana, Bona, & Pérez, 2007).
hus,  more  agency costs will arise from the concentration of
ecision  power within little number of people or their family
Bennedsen & Nielsen, 2010).
Considering high agency costs, limitation of opportunity
f  investments caused by asymmetric altruism and entrench-
ent,  we  suggest the following working hypothesis: e n t r e v i e w 1 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 30–41 37
H2. Asymmetric altruism and entrenchment in family ﬁrms
will  lead to a negative correlation with ﬁnancial performance.
5.  Methodology
5.1.  Data  collection  and  sample  description
In order to accomplish our empirical study we  will collect pri-
mary  data using a quantitative method. In this regard, we will
survey  a sample of 75 Lebanese companies through a self-
administrated questionnaire with a nominal and ordinal scale.
The questionnaire will include closed questions, semi-open
questions, and modulators. We have sent copies of the ques-
tionnaire  via email to be ﬁlled out by managers or employees
of  the companies surveyed. The purpose of this inquiry is to
understand  different aspects deﬁning organizational patterns,
as  well as collecting sufﬁcient data reﬂecting the reality of the
ground  to help authenticate this study. However, some of the
respondents  may  be reluctant or uncomfortable responding
to  these questionnaires; giving as a consequence dishonest
answers. In fact, some of the surveyed managers may  want to
give a good image  of their performance.
In the aim of performing our study we  will consider the
Middle  East region, focusing particularly on Lebanon. In fact,
our  sample consist of Lebanese companies including all types
of  enterprises (family ﬁrms, none family ﬁrms, and listed com-
panies  in the Beirut Stock Exchange). The enterprises sampled
operate  in different types of sectors (Real Estate and Construc-
tion,  Trading, Trading, Food and Beverage, Services, Industrial,
and  Telecommunications). The diversiﬁcation of the sample
will  enable it to be fairly representative of the actual state of
the  total ﬁrms in the Lebanese market. For this reason, we  have
chosen  seventy ﬁve Lebanese companies out of approximately
ﬁve  thousand ﬁve hundred companies. The sample’s diversi-
ﬁed  identity will be described in the following tables. While
the  ﬁrst table will characterize the companies by their type of
business,  the second table will distinguish the companies in
reference to their sector.
5.2.  Method  of  analysis
We  accomplished this study to see whether family involve-
ment,  entrenchment and asymmetric altruism, later genera-
tion  governance, and the presence of outside directors affect
the  ﬁnancial performance of the Lebanese family ﬁrms. The
response  rate for the questionnaires sent via the internet was
approximately 52%, noting that 48% of the companies sur-
veyed  failed to give the necessary feedback. The cause of the
lack  of reply of those companies was possibly due to a lack
of  enough time to ﬁll out the questionnaire sent, or may be
caused  by the desire of managers, owners, or employees to
keep  such information as strictly discrete. Yet, the number of
response  rate collected will still enable us to proceed with our
study.
Although  the initial years of our study were  three, the
questionnaire that was  sent to collect primary data regarding
the  independent variables considered only one year which is
2012. This single year consideration was due to the aspect
of  the Lebanese culture where management, ownership, and
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direction are less likely to change over a period of three years.
As  for the dependent variables, the questionnaire was  initially
meant  to concern three years, but as we got through with our
study,  we noticed that the same answers were given over the
three  years period, thus allowing us to use a single year con-
sideration.  The year considered was  2012, consistent with the
year  that we  took into account for the independent variables.
After  ﬁnishing our data collection, we  are going to operate
them  through the “SPSS program”  or the “Statistical package
for  the Social Science” using the Spearman test of correlation.
5.3.  Characteristic  of  variables
The dependent variable is deﬁned as a factor that is changed
by  the effect of a related component called the independent
variable.
In  our case the dependent variable measured is the ﬁnan-
cial  performance. Although many  components can measure
ﬁnancial  performance of a company, we  are going to rely on
what  we consider main indicators:
1. Return On Assets (ROA)
2.  Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT)
An independent variable can be explained as a variable
which is presumed to determine or affect an independent vari-
able. It is also considered a factor that can be manipulated or
controlled.All  the way  through this study, we took into account
four  independent variables:
1.  Family involvement in ownership and management
2. Entrenchment and asymmetric altruism
In order to describe a company as family owned, the family
must  own at least 50% of its shares owned by the family, con-
ﬁrmedly  with Bennedsen et al. requirements in their study of
family  ﬁrms in Denmark (Bennedsen, Nielsen, & Wolfenzon,
2004).  During this study we  have developed three main indi-
cators  for family involvement in ownership and management
which are:
1.  Family ownership of the ﬁrm (FO)
2. Proportion of family managers in the business (PFM)
3.  Presence of family CEO (CEO)
In the aim of measuring entrenchment asymmetric altru-
ism  we have adopted ﬁve main indicators which are:
1.  The robustness of the relationship between managers and
family  owners (MFO)
2.  The length of time of a managerial position held by a family
member  (LTM)3.  The perceived qualiﬁcation of the family manager (PQ)
4.  Degree of openness to innovation of the family manager
(DO)
5.  The use of company resources for personal reasons (UPR)e m e n t r e v i e w 1 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 30–41
6.  Results
6.1.  Relationship  linking  family  involvement  in
ownership and  management  to  the  ﬁrm  ﬁnancial
performance
In the aim of determining the authenticity of our ﬁrst hypoth-
esis  which states that family involvement in ownership and
management is positively correlated to ﬁnancial performance,
we  will test the signiﬁcance of the correlations between the
independent  and dependent variables using the Spearman
test  for correlations. We will ﬁrst test the independent vari-
ables  with the ﬁrst dependent variable which is the 2012 ROA,
than  with the second dependent variable which is the 2012
EBIT.
Regarding  the ﬁrst indicator which is family ownership of
the  business, as can be seen from the correlations table, there
is  a high positive relationship between family ownership of
the  business and the return on assets for 2012 (r = 0.695). This
relationship  is statistically signiﬁcant since the P-value = sig.
(2-tailed)  = 0.000 ≤ 0.05.
With respect to the second indicator which is the presence
of  family managers in the business, as can be seen from the
correlations  table, there is a moderate positive relationship
between presence of family managers in the business and the
return  on assets for 2012 (r = 0.552). This relationship is statisti-
cally  signiﬁcant since the P-value = sig. (2-tailed) = 0.000 ≤ 0.05.
Considering  the third indicator which is the presence of a fam-
ily  CEO, as can be seen from the correlations table, there is
a  very low negative relationship between presence of a fam-
ily  CEO in the business and the return on assets for 2012
(r  = −0.136). This relationship is not statistically signiﬁcant
since the P-value = sig. (2-tailed) = 0.409 > 0.05.
Regarding the ﬁrst indicator which is family ownership of
the  business, as can be seen from the correlations table, there
is  a high positive relationship between family ownership of the
business  and the earnings before interest and taxes for 2012
(r  = 0.660). This relationship is statistically signiﬁcant since the
P-value  = sig. (2-tailed) = 0.000 ≤ 0.05.
With respect to the second indicator which is the presence
of  family managers in the business, as can be seen from the
correlations  table, there is a moderate positive relationship
between presence of family managers in the business and the
earnings  before the interest and taxes for 2012 (r = 0.477). This
relationship  is statistically signiﬁcant since the P-value = sig.
(2-tailed)  = 0.002 ≤ 0.05.
Considering the third indicator which is the presence of a
family  CEO, as can be seen from the correlations table, there
is  a very low negative relationship between presence of a fam-
ily  CEO in the business and the earnings before interest and
taxes  for 2012 (r = −0.130). This relationship is not statistically
signiﬁcant since the P-value = sig. (2-tailed) = 0.431 > 0.05.
In  Sum, even though the presence of family CEO had no
signiﬁcant impact on the dependent variables, the two main
independent  variables which are family ownership of the
business  and the presence of family managers in the ﬁrm,
respectively demonstrated high and moderate positive corre-
lation  with both the return on assets and the earnings before
interest  and taxes. Hence, one should accept the ﬁrst working
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ypothesis that suggests that family involvement in owner-
hip  and management is positively correlated to ﬁnancial
erformance.
.2.  Relationship  linking  asymmetric  altruism  and
ntrenchment to  the  ﬁrm  ﬁnancial  performance
n the aim of determining the authenticity of our sec-
nd  hypothesis which states that asymmetric altruism and
ntrenchment in family ﬁrms will lead to a negative correla-
ion  with ﬁnancial performance, we  will test the signiﬁcance
f  the correlations between the independent and dependent
ariables using the Spearman test for correlations.
We will ﬁrst test the independent variables with the ﬁrst
ependent variable which is the 2012 ROA, than with the sec-
nd  dependent variable which is the 2012 EBIT.
Regarding the ﬁrst indicator which is the relationship link-
ng  family owners to high corporate managers, as can be seen
rom  the correlations table, there is a very low negative rela-
ionship  between the relationship linking family owners to
igh corporate managers and the return on assets for 2012
r  = −0.187). This relationship is not statistically signiﬁcant
ince the P-value = sig. (2-tailed) = 0.225 > 0.05.
With respect to the second indicator which is the length of
ccupancy  of managerial position by family managers, as can
e seen from the correlations table, there is a very low negative
elationship between the length of occupancy of managerial
osition by family members and the return on assets for 2012
r  = −0.187). This relationship is not statistically signiﬁcant
ince the P-value = sig. (2-tailed) = 0.841 > 0.05.
Considering the third indicator which is the family man-
ger  is open to innovation, as can be seen from the correlations
able,  there is a low negative relationship between the open-
ess  to innovation of family managers and the return on
ssets  for 2012 (r = −0.299). This relationship is not statistically
igniﬁcant since the P-value = sig. (2-tailed) = 0.065 > 0.05.
Regarding the fourth indicator which is the degree of
he  perceived qualiﬁcation of the family manager, as can be
een  from the correlations table, there is a low positive rela-
ionship  between the perceived qualiﬁcations of the family
anagers  and the return on assets for 2012 (r = 0.339). This
elationship is statistically signiﬁcant since the P-value = sig.
2-tailed)  = 0.035 ≤ 0.05.
With respect to the ﬁfth indicator which is degree of family
anager use of company resources for personal objectives,
s  can be seen from the correlations table, there is a very
ow  positive relationship between degree of family manager
se  of company resources for personal objectives and the
eturn  on assets for 2012 (r = 0.137). This relationship cannot
e  regarded as statistically signiﬁcant since the P-value = sig.
2-tailed)  = 0.405 > 0.05.
Regarding the ﬁrst indicator which is the relationship link-
ng  family owners to high corporate managers, as can be seen
rom  the correlations table, there is a very low negative rela-
ionship  between the relationship linking family owners to
igh corporate managers and the earnings before interest and
axes  for 2012 (r = −0.170). This relationship is not statistically
igniﬁcant since the P-value = sig. (2-tailed) = 0.302 > 0.05.
With  respect to the second indicator which is the length of
ccupancy  of managerial position by family managers, as can e n t r e v i e w 1 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 30–41 39
be seen from the correlations table, there is a very low positive
relationship between the length of occupancy of managerial
position by family members and the earnings before inter-
est  and taxes for 2012 (r = −0.187). This relationship cannot
be  regarded as statistically signiﬁcant since the P-value = sig.
(2-tailed)  = 0.466 > 0.05.
Considering the third indicator which is the family man-
ager  is open to innovation, as can be seen from the correlations
table,  there is a low negative relationship between the
openness to innovation of family managers and the return
on  assets for 2012 (r = −0.345). This relationship can be
regarded as statistically signiﬁcant since the P-value = sig. (2-
tailed) = 0.032 > 0.05.
Regarding the fourth indicator which is the degree of the
perceived  qualiﬁcation of the family manager, as can be seen
from  the correlations table, there is a very low positive rela-
tionship  between the perceived qualiﬁcations of the family
managers  and the earnings before interest and taxes for 2012
(r  = 0.170). This relationship is not statistically signiﬁcant since
the  P-value = sig. (2-tailed) = 0.302 ≤ 0.05.
With respect to the ﬁfth indicator which is degree of family
manager use of company resources for personal objectives,
as  can be seen from the correlations table, there is a very
low  positive relationship between degree of family manager
use  of company resources for personal objectives and the
return  on assets for 2012 (r = 0.114). This relationship cannot
be  regarded as statistically signiﬁcant since the P-value = sig.
(2-tailed)  = 0.490 > 0.05.
In sum, the majority of entrenchment and asymmetric
altruism variables failed to have a signiﬁcant negative rela-
tionship  with both the return on assets and the earnings
before interest and taxes. Thus, one should reject the second
hypothesis that entrenchment and asymmetric altruism will
lead to negative correlation with ﬁnancial performance.
7.  Conclusion
The paramount purpose of this study is to discuss the question
of  how family involvement in ownership management and
direction  affects the ﬁnancial performance of the company. In
that aim, we  performed an inquiry by surveying 39 Lebanese
companies through a questionnaire. The concern of the survey
was  to reveal whether family involvement in ownership and
management, entrenchment and asymmetric altruism have a
signiﬁcant impact on the company’s ﬁnancial performance.
Before performing an analysis of the obtained results, one
should  bear in mind the particular situation of the Lebanese
companies, which will highly effect our deductions. This situ-
ation  is emphasized by the strong family oriented culture that
inﬂuences  owners as well as managers, directors and employ-
ees.
The  ﬁrst signiﬁcant result obtained was the validation
of our ﬁrst working hypothesis. In fact, family involvement
in  ownership and management in the Lebanese companies
proved  to be positively correlated with the ﬁrm ﬁnancial per-
formance.  Conﬁrming with our literature review, the family
involvement in ownership and management will contribute
to  a mitigation of agency costs. In fact, the initial conﬂict of
interest  between ownership and management will be nearly
 n a g 
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none existent, and the family managers will no longer be
regarded  as agents seeking to achieve their own personal
goals,  but as stewards that view the success of the organiza-
tion  as their own. This mitigation of agency costs and alliance
between  ownership and management will enable the com-
pany  to achieve better ﬁnancial performance.
The second signiﬁcant result obtained was  the rejection of
our  second working hypothesis. In other words, entrenchment
and  asymmetric altruism did not prove to have negative rela-
tionship  with the ﬁnancial performance of the Lebanese ﬁrms.
This  is highly due to the Lebanese culture that considers the
family  manager who has long stayed in his position inside
the  company as a steward rather than an employee with the
characteristic  of entrenchment. Moreover, in the aim of pre-
serving  the family name, family managers constantly update
their  knowledge and skills which is not a characteristic of an
entrenched  manager. What was  previously acknowledged can
be reﬂected by 34 (87%) of the respondents, who perceived
family managers or managers that have a close relationship
with  the family, as high qualiﬁed or qualiﬁed.
Yet, it is important to note that the deductions made above
are  speciﬁc to the Lebanese market. While the results can be
somewhat representative of the MENA  region due to some cul-
tural similarities shared with Lebanon, those outcomes cannot
be  generalized to the whole world noting the cultural differ-
ences,  and noting the constant political instability present in
Lebanon.
To sum up, the perception of family involvement in owner-
ship  and management in the Lebanese ﬁrms must be viewed
as  an added value for the company, since it demonstrated a
positive  relationship with ﬁnancial performance. In addition,
the  negative consequences of family involvement reﬂected
by  entrenchment and asymmetric altruism did not prove to
signiﬁcantly affect the ﬁnancial performance of the Lebanese
ﬁrm.
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